Opinion Dynamics lacks a theoretical basis. In this article, I propose to use a decisiontheoretic framework, based on the updating of subjective probabilities, as that basis.
I. INTRODUCTION

Opinion Dynamics
1-7 modeling lacks a clear theoretical basis. One unifying proposal exists for discrete opinion models 8 , but it does not include continuous opinions. A unifying framework should be able to both help us create new descriptions of new circumstances as well as, if possible, shed some light on the meaning of the already existing models. Ideally, a framework similar to that represented by Lagrangeans in Classical Mechanics, in the sense of allowing different circumstances of the world to be described within the framework, would be an important contribution to the area. Different models try to explain different aspects of the way people influence each other's opinions, often, with no common ground. While it is true that the area has observed a number of first successes in predicting a few events 9, 10 , it still lacks more testing. Models, while ingenious, are typically proposed in an ad hoc basis.
Here, we will see that Bayesian inference can be used as a basis to develop a general framework for the updating of the opinions of agents. By clearly defining what is being discussed, how communication happens, and how likely each agent considers its neighbors to know something about the problem, Bayesian rules can be used to create models that incorporate all these features, sometimes into a simple model. We will see that the formalism is general in the sense that an update rule will always be obtained, once the relevant functions are defined, meaning that the formalism is actually quite general. And, by its dependence on the communication process, it will also allow us to better understand the meaning of traditional models.
Bayesian updating rules have been used before, both for discrete models, in the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA) model 11, 12 as well as for continuous models 13 .
The CODA model allowed the observation of emergence of extremism, even when no extremist agents were observed initially. It will be briefly reviewed here as an example of the application of Bayesian update rules and I will demonstrate that it can be seen as a general case for discrete model, that are recovered as one specific limit of the model. For the purely continuous problem, where agents tell their full continuous opinion to each other will be studied here, Bayesian update models 13 recovered the qualitative results of Bounded Confidence models 6, 7 and allowed an extension where the threshold-equivalent variable is updated and stubbornness emerges as a consequence of the model.
The qualities of this framework will be discussed, also as a possible heuristic approxima-tion to rational behavior. We will show that this framework can have consequences outside pure update rules, like an easier way to treat decisions and not only opinions or with a natural definition of a network in the continuous update variable problem. We will see that a variation of the CODA model can be seen as a general case of discrete update rules, when a specific limit is taken. And, finally, the power of using Bayesian methods will be illustrated with two applications: one where the opinions lead to the breakdown of a network of trust, and another where an analysis of a case where agents share the full strength of their probabilistic opinion about a discrete choice is performed. 13 , as in Bounded Confidence models. We will also see how they relate to more traditional models.
II. BAYESIAN UPDATE MODELS: THE FRAMEWORK
III. TRADITIONAL EXISTING MODELS AND BAYESIAN VERSION
A. Discrete Opinions and the CODA Model
In the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA) model 11, 12 , each agent i is trying to decide between two conflicting options. That is, x is a discrete variable with only two possible values, assumed here to be ±1. This means that the subjective opinion f i (x) can be trivially described as f i (+1) = p i and, therefore, 
Finally, the likelihood can be chosen in the simpler possible way, that is, each agent considers there is a chance p(s j = +1|x = +1) = a > 0.5. That is, everyone assigns the same fixed chance a greater than 50% that a neighbor will choose the best alternative.
With the introduction of a social network that specifies who can be influenced by whom, the model is ready. Of course, changes of variable are often useful. This model is much simpler when we work with the log-odds ν in favor of +1, defined as ν i = ln(
Theorem causes a change in p i that translate to a simple additive process in ν i . That is, if the neighbor supports +1, ν i changes to ν i + α, where α = ln( When the spatial structure is introduced, simulations have shown 11, 12 that the emerging consensus is only local. Neighborhoods that support one idea will reinforce themselves and, with time, most of the agents become more and surer of their opinions, to the point they can be described as extremists. This happens even when all the agents had moderate opinions as initial conditions, unlike other models, where extremists have to be artificially introduced from the beginning. One should notice that the underlying continuous opinion allows us to speak of strength of opinions, unlike typical discrete models and, as such, at first, it is not so clear how CODA relates to those models.
When analyzed using the framework, it is clear how one can generalize CODA model to different scenarios. Per example, by modeling a situation where α = β and β is a function of time, it was possible to obtain a diffusive process from the CODA model where the diffusion slows down with time until it freezes 28 , with clear applications in the spread of new ideas or products. By modelling the influence of Nature as a bias in the social process of Science, CODA also proved useful to improve the understanding of how scientific knowledge might change 29 .
As an extension of the model, we can assume that the likelihoods depend not only on the opinion of the neighbor, but also on the agent's own observed choice. This is equivalent to introducing in the agent some awareness that its neighbor's choices might be dependent not only on the best choices, but could also be a reflection of its own influence upon that neighbor. For calculation purposes, assume, without lack of generality, that the first agent choice is s i = +1. That is, the likelihood P (s j = +1|x = 1) is replaced by two different
and P (s j = −1|x = −1) is replaced by
Solving the Bayes Theorem and calculating the log-odds of the opinion, if the neighbor agrees (s i = +1), we have
and, if there is disagreement,
the situation where both x = +1 and x = −1 are equally strong in influencing the agents and the agent i choice is considered irrelevant for the choice of its neighbor j. On the other hand, if the agent i considers that, when s i = +1, it is more likely that a neighbor will choose s j = +1, than we must have a > d. In this case, the steps will not have the same value and disagreement will have a more important impact than agreement.
The case where a → 1 is interesting. If a = 1 exactly, agent i expects that, whenever it chooses a and x = +1 is actually the best choice, the neighbor j will also choose x = +1 with certainty. That means that an observation of s j = +1 carries no new information, while s j = −1 would actually prove that x = +1 can not be the better choice. What happens is that, when a = 1, the problem is no longer probabilistic, but one of Classical Logic. And as soon as the agent observes both decisions on its neighbors, it is faced with an unsolvable contradiction, unless a is not exactly 1, but only close to. That is, we can work with the limit a → 1, but a should actually never be exactly 1.
Calculating the limits of the steps in Equations 3 and 4, we have, for the agreement case,
where L is finite and non-zero. For disagreement, on the other hand, we have
That is, agreement will tend to cause a negligible change to the value of ν, when compared with the change caused by disagreement. If all agents start with reasonably moderate opinions, so that, whenever they find disagreement, their choices will flip, the system, in the a → 1 case is a simple one. Whenever the neighbor agrees, the first agent will not update its opinion (or update very little, if a is not exactly 1). When the neighbor disagrees, the first agent will change its observed opinion to that of the neighbor. In other words, when agent i observes agent j choice, it always end with the same choice as j. In the limit, we obtain the traditional voter model 30, 31 .
That is, we have a dynamics where the agent only updates its mind when there is disagreement. This same update dynamics is observed in other discrete models, as per example, for Finally, the models of hierarchical voting 34, 35 , where the decision of each level is obtained from the majority of the voters, except when there is a tie, can also be easily translated into CODA Bayesian language using the same strategy as in the voter model. That is, agreement with the majority means no reinforcing of previous opinion, while disagreement leads to an observable change. If there is a slightly different likelihood in favor of one theory, when there is a tie, that theory will tend to be picked up. The same effect could also happen due to small differences in the probabilistic continuous views of the individuals in the tie groups. Interestingly, the translation of the problem into CODA formalism suggests natural extensions of the model, where the final opinion might depend also on the continuous probability each agent assigns to each proposition.
B. Continuous Variables
We can also investigate the relation between the framework and the Bounded Confidence continuous opinion models 6, 7 . That relation was studied in a previous work 13 and, for the sake of completude, it is reviewed here, as that Bayesian model will be extended in the next Section.
In this case, the agents want to learn the value of a continuous variable θ, that plays the part of x in the framework description. Each agent i has a continuous prior opinion about a variable θ, represented by a prior distribution f i (θ), with an average estimate of θ given
Here the average x i is the value that is communicated to the other agents.
Assume also the prior is a Normal distribution with uncertainty σ i . As the idea was to get a model comparable to Bounded Confidence models, it is necessary to introduce a likelihood that is a mixture of the Normal distribution (probability p), with the same uncertainty the agent assigns to his own prior, and a Uniform distribution over the whole range of possible values.
That is, the agent thinks that the other agent might know something (Normal around the true value, with probability p) or know nothing, just stating a completely random guess (Uniform, 1 − p). Using these rules the new average, after interacting with agent j will be
where
Assuming only the average estimate x i is updated, instead of the whole distribution, this generates a model with all the qualitative features of Bounded Confidence models. If one approximates Equation 9 by a step function, we actually do recover Bounded Confidence exactly.
Of course, better updatings, from the point of view of rationality, are possible. Ideally, each agent should update the whole probability distribution, but one natural next step is simply to add the updating of the second moment of the distribution (that way, one can still have Normal distributions at every step). We have then
Now the agents have a dynamics for their uncertainty and it is observed that they become more stubborn with time. This extra updating allows us to notice another interesting property of Bayesian rules. Since each parameter has a clear interpretation, it is easier to propose natural extensions of the model. We will return to this model and propose a simple new extension to better illustrate this in Section V A.
C. Rationality and Bayesian rules
A comment on the possibility of modeling rational agents is needed here. It is true that
Bayesian update rules provide a way to model how agents change their minds. However, it is important to notice that the agents described here are not completely rational. Full rationality would imply much more than just using Bayes Theorem to update subjective probabilities. One of the most simple and important characteristics one expects from full theoretical rationality is that a rational individual should analyze all information available as well as possible. And that is not done by the agents in any of the models discussed here.
Agents in the models presented here use heuristics, just as humans are believed to do 24 .
Alse, some values were assumed as known without uncertainty, as the chance a that a neighbor will favor the best hypothesis. In a real problem, a rational agent must also solve the problem of testing different likelihoods. A rational agent should also model the way the neighbors makes up their minds. That would include how each neighbor is influenced by its own neighbors, including the original agent. Such model would require a model about how the neighbor supposes the first agent decides the best option and, if the neighbor were also rational, that would include the agent having to model how the neighbor models the opinions of the agent. Approximations to full rationality are needed. But they are needed for humans to reason also, as our cognitive ability is not infinite. And simple Bayesian updating rules can suggest new rules as well as alterations in the models, if one deems them necessary. They also help explain known results better, as we have seen in Section II.
IV. USING THE FRAMEWORK
In other to explore the power of the proposed framework better, two toy models will be discussed bellow that are alterations of the continuous model and of the CODA model.
V. EXAMPLES
A. Networks Within each unconnected portion, agents trust each other with probability p =, and they all distrust those with different choices, so that p = 0 in those cases. We can also see how the fact that we understand the meaning of the variables in the Bayesian framework has allowed us to propose a natural extension of the model.
B. Discrete Choices with Continuous Verbalization
Finally, in order to better explore the formalism and also in order to make some of its properties clearer, a variant of the CODA model will be discussed where the communication between the agents is not a discrete spin value, but the full probability p i agent i assigns to the possibility that the right choice is x = +1. Notice that the fact that the communication is continuous does no imply that x should be. We still have a problem with only two possible choices x = ±1. However, the continuous probabilistic value is the communicated information. This distinction is a very important albeit neglected one. In continuous models, it is usually assumed that both the communication and the decision are continuous, but that doesn't have to be the case.
As the communication phase in the framework was changed, we need now a new likelihood, that neighbor agent j will issue the value p j in the case where x = −1 and in the case where x = +1, that is, functions f (p j |A) and f (p j |B). Since all values for p i are limited to 0 ≤ p i ≤ 1, the simplest choice is to take Beta distributions Be(p j |α, β) as priors.
where B(α, β) is obtained from Gamma functions by
The Beta distribution is the prior conjugate distribution to a Binomial likelihood. That means that α is associated with the observed number of successes in a Binomial trial and β with the number of failures. This translates in the fact that, if an agent thinks that p i > 0.5, we must have α i > β i , as well as α i < β i p i < 0.5.
As Beta function is symmetric in α e β, if we want to keep the symmetry between x = +1 and x = −1, we must have for the likelihoods that, if f (p j |x = 1) = B(α, β), then
. It is also reasonable to assume that, under uncertainty conditions, it is likely that the neighbors will get a wrong answer, that is, the likelihoods shouldn't be too different. This can be achieved by making alpha and beta not too different, per example, α = β + 1. By applying the Bayes Theorem to this problem, agent i, when observing p j , will update p i to p i (t + 1),
The normalization factors of each term cancel out and Equation 11 is exact. Furthermore, if
we adopt the same transformation of variables as in CODA model and estimate
we will see that the denominators also cancel and we have that ln(
Defining
can be rewritten in a more elegant fashion
This is similar to the CODA dynamics, except that now, at each step, instead of adding a term that is constant in size and only varies in sign, we add exactly the log-oods of the opinion of the neighbor.
Equation 11 allows us to search for solutions that are fixed points, what happens when
t).By replacing this condition in Equation 11
we have the stable fixed solutions p i = 0 ou p i = 1 for every i. There is also another trivial solution p j = 0.5 for every i, but this solution is not stable. This seems to indicate that the system will tend to the extreme values, in opposition to the models where both verbalization and decision were continuous.
These are the same stable points we had in CODA, but in the original model, the system was prevented from ever reaching them, except locally.
Simulations were prepared to confirm this prediction. Square lattices with periodic boundary conditions and von Neumann neighborhood were used and the state of the system observed after different average number of interactions t per agent. The results for the evolution of the configurations of choices can be seen in Figure 2 . At first, we observe a behavior very similar to that of the CODA model, with a clear appearance of domains with different choices. However, instead of freezing, those domains keep changing and expanding and, eventually, one of the options emerge as victorious and the system arrives at a consensus. When compared with CODA model, we can conclude that it was not the fact that agents only observed discrete choices that caused the extreme opinions. Observing the strength of those opinions can have an even stronger effect into the appearance of extreme points of view. This extremism seems to be associated actually with the problem that the choice is discrete, between two competing points of view, with no compromise possible. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We saw that Bayesian rules can provide a theoretical basis to model the change in the opinion of agents in both a more realistic and more flexible way, probably a little closer to how real people think. The framework does not tell us how people will interact, what the variables are and how they communicate, but it makes clear that all those are important parts of the process and allows them to be introduced in any new model. It is up to the modeler to determine how any system of interest really works and, therefore, the functions and details of how the framework will be applied. In that sense, it works in a similar way to Lagrangeans in Mechanics. Which Lagrangean function must be used to describe which system is a question that must be answered by the scientists working in the field, not by the formalism. The same happens here.
The introduction of these ideas in a Ising-like scenario, where only binary choices can be observed, had made it possible the modeling of the emergence of extremism in a previous work, in the context of the CODA model. Here, we have also seen how several traditional models of the literature can be obtained as a limit case of the CODA model. By applying the same framework to models of continuous opinions, it is possible to understand the Bounded Confidence models as an approximation to a Bayesian update rule when the agents keep their uncertainty unchanged. The model developed from those rules is similar, but not identical, to the Gaussian Bounded Confidence Model 38 .
It is important to stress once more that the agents in the models are not really Bayesian agents, so no claim that humans are exactly Bayesians is implied. Once the approximate interaction rules are found, the agents in the framework follow them in a dumb way. Modeling agents with a less limited rationality can be an interesting project and it would easier to implement with Bayesian rules, but that was not the approach of this paper. On that line, it should be particularly interesting to investigate extensions of the model using perceptrons, per example, with the use of Hebbian algorithms 39 and work in that line is currently being conducted 40 .
What we have is that the Bayesian framework provides a good approach to creating opinion models. It can help creating better, but still simple, interaction rules to be used when studying social problems. As a framework, it is both a generalization of several traditional models and something that can be used once first principles of human interactions become clear. Another interesting aspect is that natural extensions of the model are suggested by the framework. We have explored extensions as the network of trust and the continuous communication in discrete choice problems. Other extensions are certainly possible, simply by making different approximations to a rational decision. And not only opinions can be modeled that way, but also choices and actions, thus expanding the reach of Opinion Dynamics.
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